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Supreme Court No. 910174
Priority 16

KIM C. MOORE,
Appellee.

BRIEF OP APPELLANT
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Appellant, Copper State Leasing Company, (hereinafter "Copper
State") by and through its counsel of record, hereby submits this
brief.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

This Appeal is taken pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Supreme Court of Utah has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Title 78-2-2(3) (j), Utah
Code Ann, 1953 as amended.
2.

This Appeal

is from a dismissal with prejudice of

Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to prosecute.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the lower Court abuse its discretion in dismissing

Appellant's Complaint with prejudice, based upon Appellee's Motion
1

to Dismiss?
2.

Does the sua sponte dismissal of Appellant's Complaint,

with prejudice by the lower Court for failure to prosecute,
constitute an abuse of discretion under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure?
3.
Findings

Was it a reversible error for the lower Court to enter
of Fact, Conclusions

of Law and Order when timely

objections had been filed thereto, without any response to the
objections and without a hearing?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The standard of review of a dismissal by a lower Court,

for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, is an abuse of discretion standard. Wilson vs. Lambert,
613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980).
2.

The

propriety

of

the

entry

of

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law and an Order, over objection and without hearing
is a question of law subject to review for correctness, without
deference to the Trial Court's legal conclusions.

Barber vs.

Farmers Insurance Exchange, 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with these rules or
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or of any claim against him.
After the
plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a
jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as
2

trier of the facts may then determine them and render
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render
judgment until the close of all the evidence.
If the
court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision
and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as
an adjudication upon the merits.
Rule 4-504(1) and (2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
Statement of the Rule: (1) In all rulings by a court,
counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling
shall within fifteen days or within a shorter time as the
court may direct, file with the court a proposed order,
judgment or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before being
presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders.
Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five days after
service.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Copper State filed a Complaint on or about April 24, 1985
against Carver Hunter, Inc., a corporation, Kim C. Moore, Randy J.
Bushnell and Lawrence D. Hunter.
Defendant

was

individuals'
Agreement.

based

upon

liability

was

a

The liability of the corporate

Commercial
based

upon

Lease

Agreement.

guaranty

of

the

The
Lease

Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint, all the

Defendants except Kim C. Moore filed bankruptcy petitions.

No

further action occurred in the District Court proceeding until an
Order to Show Cause was filed by the Court on December 1, 198 6.
This

Order

to

Show

Cause

was

stricken

due

to

the

pending

bankruptcies. After Carver Hunter, Inc.'s bankruptcy was dismissed
for failure to comply with the provisions of a confirmed Plan, new
3

counsel for Plaintiff filed an Entry of Appearance and filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter on November 19, 1990.
Moore initially responded pro se through a series of motions and
responses, including a Motion to Change Venue, Motion to Dismiss
and Response to Motion for Summary Judgment.

Thereafter, Moore

retained counsel who filed additional pleadings on behalf of Moore,
which were

in essence duplicates

of Defendant Moore's pro

se

responses and Motions.
Prior

to

the

hearing

on

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment and the Defendant's Motion for Dismissal, the Court denied
Moore's Motion for Change of Venue.

Thereafter, at the hearing,

Defendant's Motion for Dismissal was argued first.

In ruling from

the bench, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup dismissed the Plaintiff's
Complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute.

Argument was

not made thereafter on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Counsel

for Defendant Moore prepared proposed

Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order.
objected

to

the

proposed

Findings.

Findings of

Counsel for Plaintiff
Without

a

hearing

on

Plaintiff's objection, the Court entered the proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order as prepared by counsel for Moore
on April 3, 1991.

As a result of the Court's rulings, Plaintiff

has filed this Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about April 24, 1985, a Complaint was filed against

Carver-Hunter, Inc., a corporation, Kim C. Moore, Randy J. Bushnell
and Lawrence D. Hunter.

(R. 2 through 12).
4

2.

The liability of the corporate Defendant was predicated

on the execution of a Commercial Lease Agreement.
3.
Appellee

(R. 4 ) .

The liability of the individual Defendants, including
Kim

C. Moore, was

predicated

upon

the

guarantees of the aforementioned Lease Agreement.
4.

execution

of

(R. 10).

Appellee answered Plaintiff's Complaint on May 6, 1985.

(R. 19).
5.

All other named Defendants filed bankruptcy.

(R. 34).

6.

An

Court

Order

December 1, 1986.
7.

to

Show

Cause was

issued

the

On January 7, 1987, the Court's Order to Show Cause was
(R. 34 and 35).

No action was taken by either party until Plaintiff filed

a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 21, 1990.
9.

on

(R. 33).

stricken due to the pending bankruptcies.
8.

by

(R. 38) .

On December 3, 1990, Appellee pro se, filed a response to

Plaintiff's

Motion

for Summary

Judgment

and

also

requested

a

hearing on Defendant's long outstanding Motion for Change of Venue.
(R. 70, 72 and 20).
10.

Appellee also filed a Motion to Dismiss.

attached as Exhibit
supplemented

M

AM

in the Addendum.

to the Court

(A copy is

This Motion has been

record by Stipulation, as

for

some

unexplained reason this Motion is not in the Court record.)
11.

Appellant responded to Defendant's Motions by filing a

Memorandum in Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Reply Memorandum
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental
Affidavit of Chris Davis.

(R. 75, 80 and 92).
5

Appellant also

filed a Notice to Submit for Decision at the same time.
12,

(R. 87).

Thereafter, Appellee retained counsel, who filed a series

of additional pleadings as identified below, which are essentially
duplicates of Moore's pro se responses.
a.

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Change of Venue.

(R. 101).
b.

Supplemental

Memorandum

in

Opposition

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

to

the

(R.

(R. 107).

c.

Affidavit of Kim C. Moore.

(R. 121).

d.

Motion for Dismissal.

e.

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Dismissal.

(R. 124).

126) .
f.

Motion for Decision and Oral Argument.

(R. 99) .

(Copies of the Motion for Dismissal, Memorandum in Support and
Affidavit are attached hereto as Exhibit M B " to the Addendum).
13.

Subsequently, Plaintiff

filed a series of

responsive

pleadings as follows:
a.

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for

Change of Venue.
b.

(R. 130).

Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Supplemental

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
c.

(R. 142).
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Chris Davis in

Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
d.

(R. 152) .

Memorandum in Response to Defendant Kim C. Moore's

Motion to Dismiss.

(R. 154).

e.

Affidavit of Chris Davis in Support of Plaintiff's

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
(R. 164). (Copies of the Plaintiff's responsive pleadings to
the Motion to Dismiss are attached as Exhibit "C".
14.

Oral argument on Copper State's Motion

for Summary

Judgment and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was scheduled for March
11, 1991.
15.

(R. 89).
The Court ruled on Defendant's outstanding Motion for

Change of Venue on February 1, 1991, denying it and allowing the
litigation to continue (R. 90 and 170).
16.

At the hearing of March 11, 1991, the Honorable Kenneth

Rigtrup dismissed Copper State's Complaint with prejudice for
failure to prosecute.
17.

(R. 173).

Based upon the request of Plaintiff's counsel for written

Findings and Conclusions, counsel for Appellee prepared proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order, to memorialize
the ruling of the Court.

(R. 178 through 181) .

Copies of the

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order are addended hereto
as Exhibit "D".
18.

A timely objection was filed to the aforementioned

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on March 27, 1991.
(R. 174-177) .

A copy of Copper State's Objections is attached

hereto as Exhibit "E M .
19.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were

entered by the Court on April 3, 1991, without a hearing on
Plaintiff's objection.

(R. 181).

A copy of the lower Court's

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order are attached hereto
as Exhibit "F".
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is Copper State's position that the lower Court abused its
discretion in dismissing its Complaint with prejudice for lack of
prosecution.

Copper State also believes the Court's entry of the

proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order without a
hearing

upon

discretion

Plaintiff's

and

objection

unnecessarily

was

prejudices

a

further

Plaintiff

abuse

in that

of
the

Findings do not accurately reflect the proceeding or the basis of
the Court's Order.
The dismissal

of an action

for failure to dismiss

is an

extreme remedy that should only be used by a trial court with
caution.

Intermountain Physical Medicine Associates vs. Micro-Dex

Corporation, 739 P.2d

1131

(Utah App. 1987).

The

Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss was based upon laches, which is an equitable
remedy.
doctrine

Defendant did not sufficiently support his claim that the
of

laches

should

be

applied

in

this

situation

and

therefore the lower Court abused its discretion if it relied upon
the Defendant's Motion and Affidavit

in dismissing

Plaintiff's

Complaint.
In

the

alternative,

if

the

Court

entered

dismissal

of

Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice sua sponte, then this action
was also an abuse of the Court's discretion.

Plaintiff had no

knowledge that the Court would consider dismissing this matter on
its own Motion and rely on factors other than those set forth in
Defendant's

Motion

circumstances

of

and

the

Memorandum.

case

did

not
8

Further,
warrant

a

the

facts

dismissal

and
with

prejudice.
Copper State was actively pursuing the matter at the time the
Motion for Dismissal was filed and at the time of the Court's
ruling and therefore the Dismissal was inappropriate.

There was no

showing by the Defendant or the Court that there has been any
prejudice

to

the

therefore

the

Defendant

Court's

which

Order

of

could

not

Dismissal

be
was

remedied
an

and

abuse

of

discretion.
Finally, the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order entered by the Court were entered over Plaintiff's Objection
without a hearing in contravention to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.
Findings,

Conclusions

It is Copper State's position that the

and Order entered

by the Court did

not

accurately reflect the Court's ruling from the bench and therefore
denied

Copper

State

the

opportunity

to

have

an

accurate

and

complete record of the Court's decision, thereby creating error
justifying reversal and remand to District Court.
ARGUMENT
I. THE EFFECTS OF THE DELAY AS ALLEGED BY DEFENDANT DID NOT
JUSTIFY DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE
The dismissal of Copper State's Complaint with prejudice was
in error if the Court based its decision upon Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.
been

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss alleged that it had

harmed

by

the

delay

in

the

prosecution

of

Plaintiff's

Complaint.

However, the grounds alleged by the Defendant were not

sufficient

to justify

prejudice.

In order to fully understand the minimal effects caused

dismissal

9

of Plaintiff's

Complaint

with

by the delay and the insufficiency of the support for Defendant's
Motion, it is necessary to quickly review the proceedings.
As

set

forth

in this

Statement

of

Facts,

subsequent

to

Defendant Kim C. Moore's Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, no action
in this matter before the District Court occurred until the Court's
own Order to Show Cause was issued on December 1, 1986.

(R. 33).

In response to that Order, counsel for Copper State informed the
Court of the pending bankruptcies of Kim C. Moore's co-defendants
and

requested

that

the

matter

not

be

dismissed.

(R.

34) .

Consequently, the Court ordered that the Order to Show Cause be
stricken as a result of the bankruptcies.
action was taken

(R. 35) .

No further

in the District Court by either party

until

November 26, 1990 when a Notice of Appearance of successor counsel
for Plaintiff was filed with the Court,

contemporaneously with a

Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum and supporting Affidavits.
(R. 36, 38, 40, 51 and 65).

Thereafter, Defendant Kim C. Moore

responded pro se to the Motion by filing an Answer to Motion for
Summary Judgment

(R. 70) , a Motion to Dismiss

(Exhibit "A" in

Addendum), Request for Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Change of
Venue

(R. 72) and Request for Hearing on Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss (R. 74).
Thereafter, Copper State replied to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss on the basis that the Motion stated no legal authority, and
was not supported by either a Memorandum or Affidavit in support of
the statement set forth in the Motion.

(R. 75) .

Subsequent

thereto, Defendant retained counsel who filed additional pleadings
10

in connection with Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Those include a
Motion for Dismissal (R. 124), a Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Dismissal (R. 126) and Affidavit of Kim C. Moore (R. 121) .
Defendant's Motion for Dismissal was based upon a theory of laches.
The lower Court's ruling in dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint
with prejudice states that it was based on Plaintiff's failure to
prosecute.

It is unclear whether this ruling is based upon

Defendant's argument of laches or upon the Court's own theory
concerning

the

matter.

However,

if

it

is based

upon

the

Defendant's theory of laches, it is an abuse of the Court's
discretion
application

as
of

there
the

was

not

equitable

a

sufficient

doctrine

of

showing
laches

to

for

the

dismiss

Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.
As set forth in Defendant's Memorandum, his theory of laches
was based on the following statement of fact:
The Defendant has been prejudiced by the delay in that he
can no longer locate documents and witnesses which are
necessary to support his defense to the plaintiff's case.
(R. 127).
It should be noted that this statement

is only

in the

Memorandum and is not supported in any way by the Affidavit of Kim
C. Moore.

(R. 121). Consequently, this unsupported statement is

conclusory and has no evidentiary value whatsoever upon which the
Court can rely in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.

Without any

factual basis, the Court had no basis upon which to make its
ruling.
Further, the theory of laches does not apply as a basis for
11

dismissing an action when the conduct complained of occurred after
filing

of the

action.

The doctrine of

laches applies as an

equitable remedy to relieve a party from liability from conduct and
unreasonable delay that occurred prior to the commencement of an
action.

It has often been referred to as an equitable statute of

limitations.
As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Patterson
vs. Hewitt [citation omitted]. "Some degree of diligence
in bringing suit is required under all systems of juris
prudence."
Just as the statute of
limitations
establishes the requisite degree for actions at law, so
is laches the rule for equitable actions. ...as a result,
while "in actions at law, the question of diligence is
determined by the words of the statute..." in suits in
equity the question is determined by the circumstances of
each particular case.
Adair vs. Hustace, 640 P.2d 294, 300 (Haw 1982).

(See, also. City

of Bothell vs. King County, 723 P.2d 547 (Wash. App. 1986)).
Moore's Motion to Dismiss complains of delays which occurred
subsequent to the filing of the Complaint.
laches does not apply in such situations.
is an equitable device designed

The equitable rule of
"The doctrine of laches

to bar stale claims where an

excessive amount of time has passed prior to the assertion of a
claim."

Schraft vs. Leis, 686 P.2d 685, 687 (Kan. 1984) (emphasis

added).

Similarly, the Supreme Court of the State of California

stated "...the affirmative defense of laches requires unreasonable
delay in bringing suit..."
614 P.2d

258, 264

Miller vs. Eisenhower Medical Center,

(Cal. 1980).

(See, also. In Re Marriage of

Sanborn, 777 P.2d 4 (Wash. App. 1989)).
Even assuming that the doctrine of laches applies after the
commencement

of

the

case,

the
12

Defendant

did

not

provide

a

sufficient showing that all the elements of laches were present.
The elements of laches were set forth in the case of Papanikolas
vs.

Suaarhouse

Shopping

Center, 535 P.2d

1236

(Utah

1975) as

follows:
To constitute laches, two elements must be established
(1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; (2)
an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence.
Id. at 1260.
Defendant Moore argued that the passage of time equated with
lack of diligence.

However, "...delay or lapse of time alone does

not constitute laches".

Bloomenthal vs. Concrete Constructors Co.

of Albuquerque, Inc., 692 P.2d 50, 57 (N.M. App. 1984).
also, Moore vs. Phillips, 627 P.2d 831 (Kan. App. 1981)).
diligence requires an unexplained

(See,
Lack of

and unreasonable delay which

renders enforcement of Plaintiff's cause of action inequitable.
Johnson vs. Estate of Shelton, 754 P.2d 828 (Mont. 1988).
While there was certainly delay in this matter, the Defendant
has pointed out no delay which was unexcused or due to a lack of
diligence.

Further,

Plaintiff's

Memorandum

in

Response

and

supporting Affidavits (R. 154 and 164) clearly provide reasons for
the delay.

Those included the fact that Defendant Moore's co-

obligors filed bankruptcy.

A further explanation of delay is the

fact that Copper State had assigned its interest in the contract to
a third party, Lease West, to collect on the obligation.

After

Copper State was placed into liquidation by the Utah Department of
Financial

Institutions,

the

receiver/liquidator

canceled

the

executory contract of Lease West and demanded back the assigned
13

accounts. Lease West refused to return the accounts and litigation
was commenced to force the return of the accounts.

Ultimately,

this account was returned and Copper State began steps toward
pursuing Moore, the sole remaining non-bankrupt Defendant.
On the basis that there has been a reasonable explanation of
the delays, coupled with the fact that Defendant made absolutely no
showing

of

prejudice,

the

Court's

dismissal

of

Plaintiff's

complaint was an abuse of discretion and should be overruled.
In addition, it has been recognized that the Defendant has the
same rights and obligations to proceed with litigation as does the
Plaintiff.
unsupported

Even if the Court were to recognize the Defendant's
factual

statement

that

witnesses

are

no

longer

available, the Defendant certainly has had the opportunity to
preserve evidence by the taking of depositions and performing other
discovery to preserve evidence in his favor. Clearly, Rule 4-104,
Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides that any party may
certify a matter as ready for trial. Defendant having elected not
to take any action in this case, cannot now complain that it has
been prejudiced by the mere length of time it has taken Plaintiff
to pursue the one non-bankrupt Defendant.
Therefore, Copper State believes Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss
was legally and factually insupportable and therefore provided no
basis for the Court to make a ruling.
requirements

to

review all

Because of the Court's

facts under the totality

of the

circumstances, Department of Social Services vs. Romero, 609 P.2d
1323

(Utah

1980),

the

lower court abused
14

its discretion in

dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.

Therefore, this

Court should overrule the Court's Order, deny Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and

remand

to the

lower Court

for consideration of

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
WHEN AN ACTION IS BEING PURSUED IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The basis of the Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of
action was for failure to prosecute.

Though neither the Court's

minute entry nor the Order entered by the Court specifically
states, the Order was presumably based upon Rule 41(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which reads in relevant part as follows:
Involuntary Dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with these rules or
any order of court, the defendant may move for dismissal
of an action or of any claim against him. ...Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision... operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
In the present matter, Appellee did not move the Court under
Rule 41(b) to dismiss for failure to prosecute.

As set forth in

Point I above, Appellee's Motion to Dismiss was based upon laches.
However, the Court dismissed Copper State's cause of action for
failure to prosecute.
As the Appellee did not bring his Motion on this basis, it is
Copper State's belief that the Court relied on its own legal theory
as the basis for its ruling. While the Court has the authority to
dismiss for failure to prosecute, it must exercise this power only
if there is no excuse for delay.

Westinahouse El. Sup. Co. vs.

Paul W. Larsen Con.. Inc.. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).

A dismissal

on this basis must not be unreasonable or arbitrary and is subject
15

to review for abuse of discretion. £d. Further, there are certain
factors to be considered.
Some consideration should be given to conduct of both
parties, and to the opportunity each has had to move the
case forward and what they have done about it; and also
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the
other side; and most important, whether injustice may
result from the dismissal.
Id. at 879.
Had these factors been considered by the lower court and been
given the appropriate weight, Plaintiff's Complaint should not have
been dismissed.

Therefore, the Court's decision was an abuse of

discretion and should be overruled.

This is clear when the

application of these factors in cases previously ruled on by this
Court are examined.
The Supreme Court in Westinahouse noted that the defendants in
that case had not sought the Court's assistance to bring the matter
to any sort of conclusion.

I_d. The Court was "not impressed that

the defendants themselves were overly diligent or manifest any
particular haste in getting the pre-trial discovery procedures
completed and on with the trial." .Id. The Supreme Court went on
to overturn the dismissal for failure to prosecute stating:
...[I]t is even more important to keep in mind that the
very reason for the existence of courts is to afford
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice
between them. In conformity with that principle, the
courts generally tend to favor granting relief from
default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse
unless it will result in substantial prejudice or
injustice to the adverse party. It is our conclusion
that the trial court failed to give proper weight to the
higher priority and that under the circumstances
described herein, the order of dismissal was an abuse of
discretion.
16

Id.
A similar result was reached in Johnson vs. Firebrand, Inc.r
571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977). In the Firebrand case, the Court relied
on three (3) factors.

First, the Court noted that "neither party

had any active interest in the matter for nearly four (4) years".
Id. at 1369.

This is comparable to the present matter in which

neither party, including Appellee, took any action for a period of
five (5) years.

Second, the Court noted that new counsel had

recently entered an appearance on behalf of the Plaintiff after
which the matter was reactivated.

.Id. Again, this is comparable

to the present action in which new counsel filed an appearance on
behalf of Copper State on November 21, 1990 and filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment contemporaneously therewith.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Firebrand relied on the fact
that neither party explained their inactivity. In considering that
factor, the Court stated:

"Since either party could have brought

the matter to a conclusion, it is difficult to see why the
Plaintiff should be denied his claim...".

Id. at 1369.

In the

present matter, Appellee has offered no explanation for his failure
to take any action during the interim. Though he filed a Motion to
Dismiss based upon laches, he filed no Affidavit
thereof.
record

in support

Consequently, there is no evidentiary material in the
supporting

any

claim

of

prejudice

or

offering

any

explanation for Defendant's failure to take action. Copper State,
on the contrary, was, as reflected by the record, involved in
bankruptcy proceedings with all of the Appellee's co-defendants.
17

After examining the conduct of the parties, the Supreme Court in
Firebrand overturned the dismissal stating:
The conduct of all parties cannot be readily explained;
and in view of the fact that new counsel caused the case
to be activated, it seems the court abused its discretion
in dismissing the case on a motion to dismiss that was
filed at the same time as the answer.
Id. at 1370.
In the present matter, new counsel not only reactivated the
case, but

filed a Motion

for Summary Judgment prior to the

Defendant filing any Motion to Dismiss and well prior to the date
the Court dismissed the matter sua sponte for failure to prosecute.
During the interim between the filing of the two (2) potentially
dispositive Motions and the scheduled hearing the Court even ruled
on Appellee's outstanding Motion for Change of Venue, denying it,
without any indication that the case was not being properly
pursued.

In light of the holding in Firebrand, the Third District

Court's action constitutes an abuse of discretion.
A more recent Utah case, Maxfield vs. Rushton, 779 P. 2d 237
(Utah App. 1989), reviews the foregoing cases and provides a
thorough examination of factors which should be considered in a
Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute.

The Court stated:

The factors which we consider may include the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The conduct of both parties;
the opportunity each party has had to move the case
forward;
what each of the parties has done to move the case
forward;
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the
other side; and
most important, whether injustice may result from the
dismissal.
18

Id. at 239.
In the Maxfield case, the dismissal for failure to prosecute
was upheld. However, there is a clear factual distinction between
Maxfield and the present matter.

The Court of Appeals noted in

Maxfield that the defendants had filed four (4) separate Motions
indicating their readiness for trial.

Id. at 240.

The Court

further noted that the defendants pursued discovery, including the
taking of depositions, and were forced to file Motions to Compel
against the plaintiff.

Consequently,

it appears as

if the

plaintiff in Maxfield was involved in a course of conduct amounting
to intentional, or at least unexcused, delay.
Further, it was noted in the Maxfield case that there was
evidence that the defendant7s witnesses had become unavailable in
the nine (9) years the case was pending.

In the present matter,

there is no evidence that the Appellee suffered any prejudice. A
statement to that effect is made in his Memorandum (R. 127) , but
that statement is unsupported by any reference to an Affidavit or
any other portion of the record.

Of course, as a result of the

dismissal in the present action, Copper State has suffered the
extreme prejudice of losing its opportunity to have its action
heard on the merits, creating the greater injustice that the Court
in Maxfield said should be avoided.
There have been

similar decisions by Federal

Courts in

reviewing dismissals for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The rulings of

Federal Courts are generally considered persuasive authority on the
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interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, due to the
fact that they were patterned thereafter. Winegar vs. Slim Olson.
Inc., 252 P.2d 205 (Utah 1953); Wilson vs. Lambert. 613 P.2d 765
(Utah 1980).

Federal Courts, while citing numerous factors to

consider, tend to rely very heavily on the proposition that a
matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute when it is
currently being actively pursued.
546 F.Supp. 17 (1981).

Applebaum vs. Ceres Land Co. P

(See, also, Rawlins vs. United States, 286

F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1961)).
This proposition

is also

supported

by

state

courts

of

neighboring jurisdictions.
When the plaintiff has resumed work on the case and is
diligently prosecuting at the time the motion is filed,
the motion should not be granted since the policy
favoring resolution of a case on its merits is more
compelling than the rationale of Rule 41(b) which is to
prevent unreasonable delay.
Timber Tracts vs. Fergus. Elec. Co-Op., 753 P.2d 854 (Mont. 1988).
This rule was similarly stated by the Supreme Court of Nevada
in Spiegelman vs. Gold Dust Texaco, 539 P.2d 1216 (Nevada 1975),
wherein the Supreme Court of Nevada stated:
However, if the claim is presently being prosecuted with
diligence it cannot be dismissed because at some earlier
time plaintiff did not act diligently.
Id. at 1218 (citing: 9 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure,
Civil §2370 at 204).
In the present matter, Copper State was actively pursuing the
matter at the time it was dismissed by the Court.

A Notice of

Entry of Appearance of Counsel on behalf of Copper State was filed
with the Court on November 26, 1990.
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That same date, Copper

State's Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting Memorandum and
Affidavit were filed.

Defendant responded to that Motion and

Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum and a Notice to Submit for
decision all of which were filed with the Court on or prior to
December 5, 1990.

Consequently, a fully dispositive motion was

before the Court over four (4) months prior to the time the Court
dismissed the Plaintiff's action sua sponte.
Additional evidence of the lower Court's abuse of discretion
is its failure to consider imposing on Plaintiff lesser sanctions
for the alleged prejudice suffered by the Defendant.

(R. 174) .

The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, overturned a
dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), for the simple
reason that the District Court failed to examine less severe
sanctions.
However, we are compelled to vacate the dismissal with
prejudice because nothing in the record indicates that
less severe sanctions were considered or, if considered,
deemed futile.
McCloud River R. Co. vs. Sabine River Forest, 735 F. Supp. 879, 883
(1984) .
In the matter presently before this Court, less severe
sanctions were not considered, even though proposed by Plaintiff.
(R. 174). Based upon the controlling factors that should have been
considered by the Court, the fact that the matter was being
actively pursued and because the Court refused to consider lesser
sanctions, dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice was an
abuse of discretion.

Copper State requests this Court to overrule

the Court's Order and remand for consideration of Plaintiff's
21

Motion for Summary Judgment,
III.

ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND AN ORDER
OF DISMISSAL, WITHOUT REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS
THERETO CONSTITUTES REVERSAL ERROR
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a tentative Order

were prepared by Appellee's counsel and served on Appellant's
counsel on March 22, 1991.

Thereafter, on March 27, 1991 Copper

State filed objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law alleging their mis-characterization of the
proceedings below.

(Copies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law, Order and Objection are addended hereto as Exhibits "D" and
"E").

Such objections are permitted pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the

Utah Code of Judicial Administration which reads in relevant part
as follows:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days,
or within a shorter time as the court may direct, file
with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in
conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments and order
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being
presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders. Notice of objection shall be submitted
to the court and counsel within five days after service.
(Emphasis added).
The record establishes that Copper State,s objections were
properly and timely filed with the Court under Rule 4-504. Though
the rule does not specifically state that a party filing such
objections is entitled to a hearing thereon, this can be reasonably
inferred from the fact that a right to object, without a right to
those objections being heard, is meaningless. Further, no response
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was

ever

filed

by

the

Appellee

to

Plaintiff's

objections.

Nevertheless, with no response in the file to Copper State's
objections and without any hearing on those objections, the Court
signed the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
entered the Order dismissing Plaintiff's cause of action on April
3, 1991.

Copper State was thereby denied the right to have the

Court's full decision making process made part of the record. The
entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
constitutes reversible error and a second basis justifying reversal
of the Order of Dismissal of the District Court.
CONCLUSION
Kim

Moore's

Motion

to

Dismiss

based

upon

laches

was

insufficient justification for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint with prejudice.

Laches is not an appropriate theory to

dismiss a cause of action when the conduct complained of occurs
subsequent to the filing of the Complaint.

Further, there is no

evidence before the Court of any prejudice to the Defendant.
Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances before the
Court, it was an abuse of the lower Court's discretion to dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice, thereby doing injustice to
the Plaintiff by denying it an opportunity to have this matter
fully considered.
If dismissal of Copper State's cause of action was done sua
sponte,

such

action

by

the

Court

constitutes

an

abuse

cf

discretion. Copper State was actively pursuing its cause of action
having recently filed a Notice of Appearance of Counsel and Motion
23

for Summary Judgment.

That Motion, which would have been fully

dispositive, had been fully briefed by the parties and was ready
for

decision

of

the

Court

at

the

time

of

the

dismissal.

Plaintiff's Motion was scheduled for hearing on the date the Court
dismissed the action sua sponte for failure to prosecute pursuant
to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
constitutes an abuse of discretion.

This action

Though there had occurred

certain delay, that delay was explained by Copper State. There is
no evidence in the record of any kind of contumacious conduct or
intentional delay on the part of Copper State.

Similarly, the

Appellee took no action to bring this matter to a conclusion.
Finally, there is no evidence in the record of any prejudice to the
Appellee as a result of the delay.
dismissal

of Copper State's

Under these circumstances,

cause of action

for

failure to

prosecute was a clear abuse of discretion, especially since the
lower Court did not consider lesser sanctions.
Similarly, the District Court's entry of Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and an Order which were prepared by counsel for
the respondent, without a hearing on Copper State's objections
thereto, constitutes a second error of law justifying the relief
sought.
Therefore, Copper State Leasing Company respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the Order of the Third Judicial District
Court dismissing Copper State's cause of action and that this
matter be remanded to the District Court for consideration of
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment awarding Appellant its
24

costs and fees.
DATED this

if

day of September, 1991.
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.

M/frk (s. Swan
Attorney for Appellant
Copper State Leasing Company
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ///^fr day of September, 1991, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Robert A. Echard
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
Attorneys for Defendant
Kim C. Moore
632 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

/#/fi*X ^J^^X/
CS893148.C91
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EXHIBIT "A"

Kim C. Moore-Defendant
4950 Quail Lane
Ogden, UT 84403

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY
Plaintiff
vs.
Kim C. Moore, et.al.
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION TO DISMISS

Civil No. C85-2626
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendant, Kim C. Moore, represented by himself hereby
moves the court to dismiss this action based upon the
following:
(1) Five and one-half years have elapsed since
Plaintiff filed its complaint during which time it made no
efforts to pursue its action until its recent motion for
Summary Judgement.
(2)

It is 'unconscionable' and probably against

'public policy* for Plaintiff to subject Defendant to
the protracted uncertainties and mental stress of such
needless delays.
(3)

The Court issued its own Order To Show Cause in

December of 1986 as to why this case should not be
dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Plaintiff's former

counsel responded with its own letter to the Court stating
that they wished to proceed immediately and that the case
not be dismissed.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff spent an additional four years of
inaction after submitting the request for non-dismissal
and vowing to proceed immediately.
It should be noted that Defendant did not receive
notice of this Order To Show Cause and was unaware of it
until approximately three weeks ago.

Although Defendant

has always represented himself in this matter, the notice
was apparently erroneously mailed to Counsel for the other
Defendants who has never represented Defendant and did
not notify defendant of the Order.

Consequently,

Defendant was unable to address Plaintiff's request.
(4)

After this protracted period of inaction,

Defendant is likely to be in a prejudiced position
inasmuch as he can no longer locate witnesses in support
of his defenses including those in a contemplated
Amendment of Answer.
Wherefore, Defendant asks that this action be

/

d ismissed .
Dated this 28th day of November, 1990
^<^T
{Cim C. Moore-Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of November,
1990, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to
be served upon the following by placing the same in the
United States mails, postage paid and addressed to:
Mark S. Swan
Richer, Swan & Overholt, P.C.
311 South State Street Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Paqe 3 of 3 Motion to Dismis

EXHIBIT »B»

3)\^
ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
801-621-3317
Fax: 801-621-3340
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. C85-2626
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER,
Judge:

Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.
COMES NOW the defendant, Kim C. Moore, and moves the
court for a dismissal of the plaintiff's Complaint for failing to
prosecute and on the theory of latches as more specifically set
forth in the memorandum of the defendant attached hereto.
DATED this

/f-day

of December, 1990.

R'OBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant
Kim C. Moore
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
JWV OFFICES

DLEY, ECHARD
&WARD
5 25TH STREET
DEN, UTAH 84401
[801) 621-3317
X (801) 621-3340

I

hereby

certify

a true

and correct

copy

of the

foregoing MOTION FOR DISMISSAL was mailed, postage prepaid, this

/ y

day of December, 1990 to Mark S. Swan and Mark E. Medcalf,

Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South State, Suite 350, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111.

SECRETARY/

)FFICES
r

, ECHARD

/ARD
-I STREET
JTAH 84401
21-3317
) 621-3340

Vv - ' :

t

ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
801-621-3317
Fax: 801-621-3340
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C85-2626

CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER,
Judge:

Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.
COMES NOW the defendant, Kim C. Moore, and submits the
following memorandum in support of his Motion to Dismiss on the
doctrine of latches or failure to prosecute.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

A Complaint in this action was signed on the 23rd

day of April, 1985, and served upon the defendant, Kim C. Moore,
on April 29, 1985.
2.

No action was taken on the plaintiff's Complaint,

and in December of 1986 the court issued its own Order to Show
Cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to
[prosecute.

The plaintiff, through its counsel, requested the

JWV OFFICES

DLEY, ECHARD
&WARD
5 25TH STREET
DEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 621-3317
X (801) 621-3340

court not dismiss the action and indicated that the case would be
immediately prosecuted.

3.
motions

which

No action was taken from December of 1986 until the
have

been

recently

filed

in

this matter on

approximately November of 1990.
4.

The defendant has been prejudice by the delay in

that he can no longer locate documents and witnesses which are
necessary to support his defense to the plaintiff's case.
ARGUMENT
Black's Law Dictionary, under the terms "laches/1 states
as follows:
'Doctrine of laches, f is based upon maxim that
equity aids the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights. It is defined as
neglect to assert right or ; ;aim which, taken
together with lapse of time and other
circumstances, cause prejudice to adverse
party, operates as a bar in court of equity...
The Montana Court in the case of Castillo v. Franks, 690
P. 2d 427 (Mont. 1984), stated that the purpose of laches is to
discourage stale demands and that the Court would refuse to
interfere where there had been a gross laches in prosecuting
rights or where long acquiescence in asserting of adverse rights
had occurred.
The Utah Court in the case of Papanikolas v. Sugarhouse
Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), stated as follows:

iFFICES

, ECHARD
^ARD
I STREET
TAH 84401
21-3317
621-3340

. . . Laches is not mere delay, but delay that
works a disadvantage to another.
To
constitute laches, two elements must be
established: (1) The lack of diligence on the
part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant
owing to such lack of diligence. Although
lapse of time is an essential part of laches,
the length of time must depend on the

circumstances
of refusing a
the gravity
defendant and

of each case, for the propriety
claim is equally predicted upon
of the prejudice suffered by
the length of plaintiff's delay.

. . . The existence of laches is one to be
determined primarily by the trial court; and
reviewing courts will not interfere with the
exercise of the trial court's discretion in
the matter, unless it appears that a manifest
injustice has been done, or the decision
cannot reasonably be found to be supported by
the evidence. . .
The Utah Court has restated the elements of laches in the cases
of

Leaver

v.

Grose,

610

P.2d

1262

(Utah,

1980),

and

Utah

Department of Transportation v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 751
P.2d 271 (Utah App., 1988).

The Utah Supreme Court in the case

of Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1987), stated that the
distinction between law and equity had long ago been abolished in
the State of Utah, and that equitable defenses applied in actions
at law and in actions based upon equity.
The defendant believes that this is a proper case in
which to apply the doctrine of laches or the failure to prosecute.
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, this case is approximately
five and one-half years old.

The court previously, on its own

motion, issued an Order to Show Cause to dismiss in December of
1986.

At

that

time, the

plaintiff

immediately proceed with the case.

indicated

that

it would

However, the plaintiff has

failed to do so and took no further action in this matter until
approximately

November

of

1990.

The

defendant

is

at

a

VW OFFICES

LEY, ECHARD
&WARD
25TH STREET
EN, UTAH 84401
01) 621-3317
(801) 621-3340

disadvantage in this matter because he can no longer locate many

of his documents and/or the witnesses he will need to defend
against the case.
It should be noted that other affidavits and motions
filed before the court demonstrate that the plaintiff did not at
any time send notice to the defendant concerning the Lease being
in default or demand under the Guaranty Agreement signed by the
defendants.

The course of action by the plaintiff

beginning has been to act in a dilatory manor.
has

been

perpetuated

Consequently,

the

throughout

defendant

the

term

respectfully

plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed

from the

The same manner

of

this

requests

lawsuit.
that

the

and that the defendant be

granted an oral argument on this motion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/P

day of December, 1990.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant
Kim C. Moore
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
foregoing

hereby

MEMORANDUM

certify
IN

a

true

SUPPORT

mailed, postage prepaid, this

/y

and

correct

OF MOTION

FOR

copy

of

the

DISMISSAL

was

day of December, 1990 to Mark

S. Swan and Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South
State, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84402-1850
801-621-3317
Fax: 801-621-3340

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
AFFIDAVIT OF KIM C. MOORE
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. C85-2626
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER,
Judge:

Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

ss

KIM C. MOORE, being first duly sworn upon his oath and
having personal knowledge, deposes and says:
1.

That your affiant is a defendant in the above

entitled action.
2.

That on about October 10, 1980, a Lease Agreement

was entered into between Carver Hunter, Inc., a Utah corporation,
and Copper State Leasing Company.

That on the same date, your

affiant signed a Guaranty Agreement. Copies of said documents are
LAW OFFICES

IDLEY, ECHARD
&WARD
135 25TH STREET
aDEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 621-3317
AX (801) 621-3340

attached hereto and incorporated by reference.

3.

That

at

no

time

was

your

affiant

given

any

notification under the terms of the Lease that the Lease Agreement
was in default as required by Paragraph 21 of the Lease Agreement.
4.

That

at

no

time

was

your

affiant

given

any

notification, written or otherwise, of a demand that he pay under
the terms of his Guaranty Agreement.
5.

That as of the 10th of October, 1980, your affiant

resided at 4950 Quail Lane, Ogden, Utah.

During the early part

of 1983, your affiant moved to 1717 Esquire, Grand Prarie, Texas.
That your affiant, during the early part of 1983, notified the
plaintiff of his address in Texas.
6.

That your affiant did not at any time receive the

letter from the plaintiff dated October 4, 1983, a copy of which
is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A.
7.

That

at

no

time

prior

to

the

filing

of

the

Complaint and Summons in this matter was your affiant notified
that the Lease Agreement was in default or notified that the
plaintiff had repossessed the property and proposed to sell it.
DATED this jj^L

da

Y

of

December, 1990,

KIM C. MOORE, Defendant
SUBSCR
December, 1990

SWORN TO before me this

/^

day of

DFFICES

', ECHARD
^ARD
H STREET
JTAH S4401
.21-3317
) 621-3340

•

^

NOTARY^PUBLIC, O g d e n / Utah
2

My Commission Expires : ^ T ^ " / 5
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF KIM C. MOORE was mailed, postage prepaid,
this

/y

day of December, 1990 to Mark S. Swan and Mark E.

Medcalf, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South State, Suite 350,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111.

SECRETARY U

.AW OFFICES

DLEY, ECHARD
&WARD
5 25TH STREET
)EN, UTAH 84401
801) 621-3317
X (801) 621-3340

EXHIBIT "C"

Mark S. Swan - 3873
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
311 South State
Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Copper State Leasing Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT KIM C. MOOREfS
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
Corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and LAWRENCE
D. HUNTER,
Defendants.

Civil No.

C85-2626

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

PLAINTIFF, Copper State Leasing Company (hereinafter "Copper
State11) , by and through its counsel of record, Mark S. Swan of the
law

firm

Memorandum
Dismiss.

RICHER,

SWAN

in Response

& OVERHOLT,

P.C.,

to Defendant

Kim

hereby

submits

this

C. Moore's Motion to

This Memorandum is supported by the Affidavit of Chris

Davis filed contemporaneously herewith.

FACTS
1.

All

bankruptcy.

of

Defendant

(See,

Affidavit

Moore's
of

co-obligors

Chris

Davis

have

in

filed

support

of

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at Paragraphs 5 and 6 ) .
2.

Plaintiff Copper State Leasing was not in possession of

the Carver-Hunter, Inc. Lease and the Guaranty of Defendant Kim C.
Moore from August, 1986 through Spring, 1990. Said Lease Agreement
was in the possession of a corporation, Lease West, and Copper
State Leasing Company was forced to pursue a legal action in order
to force Lease West to return this Lease Agreement to Copper State
Leasing Company.
Plaintiff's

(See,

Memorandum

Affidavit of Chris Davis in Support of
in Opposition

to

Defendant's

Motion

to

Dismiss at Paragraphs 3 through 6 ) .
ARGUMENT
THE DEFENSE OF LACHES WAS WAIVED
Pursuant to Rule

12(h), Utah Rules of Civil

defense is waived if not properly raised.

Procedure, a

"A party waives all

defenses and objections which he does not raise either by motion
as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his
answer."
Answer.

The defense of laches was not raised in the Defendants'
Therefore, said defense is waived unless it was raised by

Motion as provided in Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 12(b), sets forth those defenses which a party may raise by
2

Motion as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
Lack of jurisdiction over the person;
Improper venue;
Insufficiency of process;
Insufficiency of service of process;
Failure to state a claim upon which relief
granted; and
Failure to join an indispensable party.

can

be

Defendants' present Motion to Dismiss, which is based upon the
affirmative defense of laches, fits none of the aforementioned
categories.

Therefore, the defense of laches was waived pursuant

to Rule 12(h).

There being no cognizable legal basis for the

motion, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE
The defense of laches is not available to the Defendant.

The

Doctrine of Laches applies to unreasonable delay which occurs prior
to the commencement of action.

It has often be likened to the

equitable version of a Statute of Limitations.
As noted by the United State Supreme Court in Paterson
vs. Hewitt, [citation omitted] "Some degree of diligence
in bringing suit is required under all systems of juris
prudence."
Just as the Statute of
Limitations
establishes the requisite degree for actions at law, so
is laches the rule for equitable actions.
...as a
result, while ,fin actions at law, the question of
diligence is determined by the words of the statute...
in suits in equity the ^.question is determined by the
circumstances of each particular case.
Adair vs. Hustace, 640 P.2d 294, 300 (Hawaii 1982).

3

This rule has been similarly stated by the Court of Appeals
of Washington.

"Where no express statute of limitations has been

established by legislative act or Court rule, the test is whether
is brought within a reasonable time".
County, 723
matter,

P.2d

547, 550

Defendants

City of Bothell vs. King

(Wash. App. 1986).

complain

of

delays

which

In the present
occurred

after

Initially, Plaintifffs

Plaintiff commenced the present action.

cause of action against Defendant is on contract and is therefore
an action at law.

It is not an equity action and therefore the

Doctrine of Laches does not apply.
action

within

the applicable

should not be dismissed.

Since Plaintiff has brought the

statute of

limitations, the case

Secondly, since a Statute of Limitations

would have no bearing on such delays after the commencement of the
action,

and

similarly,

the

Doctrine

of

Laches

has

no

such

application.
The rule that Laches applies only to delays occurring prior
to commencement

of an action is widespread.

"The Doctrine of

Laches is an equitable device designed to bar stale claims where
an excessive amount of time has passed prior to the assertion of
a claim11.

Schraft

(Emphasis added).

vs. Leis,

686 P.2d

685, 687

(Kan.

1984).

The rule.^was similarly stated by the Supreme

Court of the State of California in Miller vs. Eisenhower Medical
Center, 614 P.2d 258 (Cal. 1980), in which the Court stated "As we
4

pointed

out in Conti vs. Board

of Civil Service

Commissioners

[citation omitted], the affirmative defense of laches
in bringing suit...'1.

unreasonable delay
added).

Finally,

M

To establish

Id. at 264

requires
(Emphasis

laches, the Defendant

has the

burden of showing that... (2) there was an unreasonable delay in
commencing the action;..."
4, 6

(Wash. App.

occurring

after

1989).
the

In Re Marriage of Sandborn, 777 P.2d
(Emphasis added).

commencement

of

this

Thus,
action,

any delays
could

not

constitute the basis for a defense of laches.
Even those cases cited by Defendant, in support of his Motion,
deal with delays which occurred prior to commencement ot an action.
1n Papanikolas Bros. Ent. vs. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. , 5 3 5 P. 2d
1256

(Utah

1975),

the delay of which

the defendant

occurred prior to commencement of the action.

complained

"Defendants assert

that this failure to file the action (18 months after the station
was completed)
added).

constituted

laches".

The same is true in Leaver

1980), where

the Court

stated

£d.

at

1260.

(Emphasis

vs. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah

"...having

placed

Defendants on

notice of the controversy that existed, certainly equity placed no
further duty upon plaintiffs to immediately
Id., at 1264.

(Emphasis added).

file a lawsuit..."

Again, the delay in question was

delay in the filing of a lawsuit, not the prosecution thereafter.
Finally, in Utah Department of Transportation vs. Reagan Outdoor
5

Advertising, Inc. , 751 P.2d 271 (Utah App. 1988), the delay in
question

was

a ten

(10) year delay

on the part

of

the Utah

Department of Transportation enforcing the removal of certain signs
which were erected in violation of the Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act.

Again, post-commencement of action delay is not the issue.
THE ELEMENTS OF LACHES ARE LACKING
The Utah Supreme Court has supplied us with one (1) definition

for laches.
To constitute laches, two elements must be established:
(1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; (2)
an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence.
Papanikolas vs. Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P. 2d 1236, 12 60
(Utah 1975).
However, "...delay or lapse of time alone does not constitute
laches..."

Blumenthal

vs.

Concrete

Constructors

Albuquergue, Inc., 692 P.2d 50, 57 (N.M. App. 1984).

of

Mere passage

of time is not enough to invoke the Doctrine of Laches.
Phillips, 627 P.2d 831 (Kan. App. 1981).

Co.

Moore vs.

Before the Doctrine of

Laches may apply, there must be an unexplained and unreasonable
delay

which

inequitable.

would

render

enforcement

of

a

Plaintiff's

right

Johnson vs. Estate of Shelton, 754 P.2d 828 (Mont.

1988) .
Though there has been certain delay in this matter, which
occurred

after the

commencement
6

of the action,

that delay

is

reasonable and can be explained.
In August, 1986, Copper State contracted with a third party,
Lease West, to collect certain of their contracts, including the
Carver-Hunter obligation guaranteed by Defendant Moore.
failure of

Lease West

to fulfill

its contractual

Upon the

obligations,

Copper State terminated that contract. However, Lease West refused
to return the accounts.
commence

legal

action

Thereafter, Copper State was forced to
against

possession of the accounts.

Lease

West

in

order

to

obtain

Ultimately, Copper State prevailed in

the aforementioned action and ultimately obtained possession of the
Carver-Hunter account in Spring, 1990. Therefore, this account was
out

of

the

possession

and

beyond

the

control

Plaintiff

for

approximately three and a half (3 1/2) years.
Further, one of the primary causes of delay in the present
action has been the sequential bankruptcy of each and every one of
Defendant's co-obligors.

Plaintiff was precluded, by operation of

the Automatic Stay of the Bankruptcy Court, from proceeding against
said

co-obligors.

However, the outcome of the

aforementioned

bankruptcies and the distribution of assets therein, had a bearing
on the amount of Plaintiff's damages, and any distributions made
from the bankruptcy estates of the co-obligors would only operate
to benefit Defendant Moore in that said distributions would reduce
the amount due and owing.

Thus, Defendant Moore stood only to
7

benefit from those delays.
Finally, the only prejudice which the Defendant alleges he has
suffered as a result of the delays is his ability to preserve and
present evidence.

However, the Defendant has the same rights under

the Rules of Civil

Procedure, to take depositions and conduct

discovery and thereby preserve evidence, as Plaintiff.

Further,

if the Defendant failed to exercise his rights under the Rules of
Civil Procedure to preserve evidence, such a failure should not
enure to his benefit.
Plaintiff,

pursuant

Similarly, Defendant has the same right as
to

Rule

4-104,

Utah

Code

gj

Judicial

Administration, to certify the matter ready for trial.

"When a

civil case is at issue, any party, not in default as provided in
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may file a written Certification
of

Readiness

for Trial".

Thus,

Defendant

is under

the

same

obligation as Plaintiff to move the matter to trial. Had Defendant
desired

to

bring

this

matter

to

a

conclusion

prior

to

the

resolution of the aforementioned bankruptcies of his co-obligors,
he was free to do so.

Defendant elected not to do so, and should

not now be heard to complain.
CONCLUSION
Only certain defenses may be raised by a motion.
not one of those defenses.

Laches is

Therefore, having not been raised in

Defendants Answer, the defense is waived.
8

However, even if the

defense were not waived, it is not applicable to delays which occur
after the commencement

of an action.

The Doctrine

corresponds in equity to the statute of limitations.

of

Laches

It applies

only to delays which occur prior to commencement of an action.
Therefore, it is not applicable to this case.

Finally, even if it

were applicable, the elements of laches are not present.
which has occurred
Plaintiff.

The delay

in this matter is not the responsibility of

Further, the delay which occurred was reasonable under

the circumstances.
have suffered

Finally, any prejudice which the Defendant may

is not the result of the delays, but

rather the

result of Detendant's failure to exercise his rights under the
Rules of Civil Procedure to preserve evidence.
THEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this jf^^day of December, 1990.
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.

\nar)i

S. Swan

Attorney for Plaintiff
Copper State Leasing Company

9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3 < 5 T day of December, 1990, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Mr. Robert A. Echard
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
635 - Twenty-Fifth Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant
Kim C. Moore

M lftVA'

CS891728.C90

10

Mark S. Swan - 3873
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
311 South State
Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Copper State Leasing Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS DAVIS
IN SUPPORT OF PIJWNTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

vs,

CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
Corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and LAWRENCE
D. HUNTER,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

Civil No.

C85-2626

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Chris Davis, being first duly sworn, depose and say as
follows:
1.

I am the Operations Manger

for Copper

State

Leasing

Company, (hereinafter "Copper State"), and have been at all times
relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint herein and Defendants1 Motion to

Dismiss.
2.

In my capacity of Operations Manager of Copper State, I

am personally familiar with the business records of Copper State
Leasing Company as they relate to the lease obligations of CarverHunter, Inc., and the Guaranty obligations of Defendant Kim C.
Moore.
3.

On or about August 26, 1986, Copper State Leasing Company

contracted with a corporation named Lease West, for the collection
of certain of Copper State's accounts.

Said accounts included the

lease of Carver-Hunter, Inc.
4.

During or about the month of November, 1987, Copper State

Leasing terminated its contract with Lease West.

However, Lease

West refused to return accounts to Copper State Leasing, including
the lease of Carver-Hunter, Inc.
5.

Thereafter, a legal action was commenced

in order to

compel Lease West to return the Copper State accounts to Copper
State.
September

In

the

aforementioned

21, 1989 to compel

action, a Motion

was

filed

on

Lease West to return accounts to

Copper State, including the Carver-Hunter lease.
6.

On or about January 24, 1990, the aforementioned Motion

was granted,

and

during

the? months thereafter, Copper

State's

accounts, including the lease of Carver-Hunter, Inc. was returned
to Copper State Leasing Company.
2

Further, Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this ,$?/ day of December, 1990.

Cpris Davis
^

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ ^ day of December,
1990,
M!c?»/l?«'~ BAKER

I
L_

_3 *J*->—

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:
\1

-y ^

'p,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 3 : y r day of December, 1990, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Mr. Robert A. Echard
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
635 - Twenty-Fifth Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendant
Kim C. Moore

-A^yrA
CS891728.c90

<htru\S)

EXHIBIT »D"

'/

ir
ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
801-621-3317
Fax: 801-621-3340

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C85-2626

CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER,
Judge:

Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.
The plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment

and the

defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on the 11th day of March, 1991, at 10:00
a.m.

The plaintiff was represented in court by its attorney, Mark

S. Swan, and the defendant, Kim C. Moore, was present in court and
represented by his attorney, Robert A. Echard.

The court having

heard argument from the parties, having reviewed the memoranda and
motions filed with the court, and being fully informed in the
*W OFFICES

premises; now therefore, makes the following findings of fact and

LEY, ECHARD
&WARD
25TH STREET
EN, UTAH 84401
01) 621-3317
(801) 621-3340

conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Complaint in this action was filed in April of

1985 seeking to collect from the defendant, Kim C. Moore, pursuant
to an agreement guarantying a lease between the plaintiff and the
defendant, Carver Hunter, Inc. The plaintiff had repossessed the
property which was security for the lease and sought to obtain a
deficiency judgment against Kim C. Moore with interest at the rate
of 18 percent per annum,
2.

On the 1st day of December, 1986, an Order to Show

Cause was issued by the court requiring the parties to show cause
why the Complaint should not be dismissed for failing to prosecute
and a hearing on said motion was set for January 7, 1987.
3.

The plaintiff wrote a letter to the court dated

December 15, 1986, in which the plaintiff committed itself to
proceed with the case as soon as possible and with due diligence.
4.

Thereafter, no change was made in the pleadings and

no further action was taken on the plaintiff's Complaint until the
plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 19,
1990.

The court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment could

have been filed as of January of 1987 and that nothing changed
between 1987 and 1990 as between the parties.
5.

The lease called for interest at the rate of 18

percent per annum and since 1986 has more than doubled; thereby
causing additional cost and expense to the defendant if a judgment
iFFICES

, ECHARD
^ARD
I STREET
TAH 64401
21-3317
621-3340

were to be obtained against him.

6.

The plaintiff has sought to excuse its delay in

prosecuting this case because of a bankruptcy that had been filed
by other named defendants. Kim C. Moore did not file a bankruptcy
and there was no federal stay order prohibiting the plaintiff from
proceeding with its case in a timely manner.
7.

The plaintiff contends that it had assigned or

transferred its right in the lease, which is the subject matter
of this Complaint, to Lease West from August of 1986 to 1990.

If

that representation is true, then the lease had been assigned
prior to the December 1, 1986 Order to Show Cause issued by this
court and the December 15, 1986 letter from the plaintiff agreeing
to proceed expeditiously on its case.

Consequently, the court

finds that this fact, if true, does not justify the plaintiff in
failing to prosecute its case.
8.

The court finds that the plaintiff has failed to

timely prosecute its case and therefore the plaintiff's Complaint
should be dismissed with prejudice.
9.

The court does not deal with the issues raised in

the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; that motion being
moot in light of the court's ruling on the defendant's Motion for
Dismissal.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed with

prejudice for failing to proceed with the prosecution of its case
*W OFFICES

•LEY, ECHARD
&WARD
25TH STREET
EN, UTAH 84401
101) 621-3317
: (801) 621-3340

in a timely manner.

2.

The court does not rule on~ the issues raised by the

plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the same having become
moot by reason of the court's dismissal of the action for failing
to prosecute.
DATED this

day of March, 1991.

KENNETH RIGTRUP
District Court Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO:

PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL:
You

will

please

take

notice

that

the

undersigned

attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore will submit the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the
date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time,
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
1988.

Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this

ST&L

day of March, 1991.

'ROBERT A. EC!
Attorney for Defendant Moore
(FF1CES

, ECHARD
kRD
I STREET
TAH 84401
21-3317
I 621-3340

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby certify

a true

and

correct

copy of the

foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed,
postage prepaid, this QJQ_ day of March, 1991, to Mark S. Swan and
Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South State,
Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.

SECRETARY

(J

&

iT i"-

^

ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
801-621-3317
Fax: 801-621-3340

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. C85-2626
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER,
Judge:

Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

The plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the
defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on the 11th day of March, 1991, at 10:00
a.m.

The plaintiff was represented in court by its attorney, Mark

S. Swan, and the defendant, Kim C. Moore, was present in court and
represented by his attorney, Robert A. Echard.

The court having

heard argument from the parties, having reviewed the memoranda and
motions filed with the court, and being fully informed in the
OFFICES

U ECHARD
VARD
H STREET
JTAH 84401
J21-3317
) 621-3340

premises; now therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that the plaintiff's cause of

action is dismissed with prejudice for failing to prosecute in a
timely manner.
DATED this

day of March, 1991.

KENNETH RIGTRUP
District Court Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL:

TO

You

will

please

take

notice

that

the

undersigned

attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore will submit the foregoing
ORDER

to

Judge

Kenneth

Rigtrup

for

his

signature

upon

the

expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed
to

you,

allowing

three

(3) days

for mailing, unless

written

objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988.

Kindly govern

yourself accordingly.
DATED this

^ f A day of March, 1991.

/ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant Moore
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
WV OFFICES

LEY, ECHARD

I

hereby

certify

a

true

correct

copy

foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ ^ L

fcWARO
25TH STREET
":N, UTAH 84401
D1) 621-3317
(801) 621-3340

and

2

of

the

day of

March, 1991, to Mark S. Swan and Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for
Plaintiff, at 311 South State, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT
84111.

-2nA
RETARY ^r
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SECRET^

OFFICES

Y% ECHARD

VARD
H STREET
UTAH 84401
621-3317
1) 621-3340
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EXHIBIT "E"

Mark S. Swan - 3873
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
311 South State
Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Copper State Leasing Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
Corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and LAWRENCE
D. HUNTER,
Defendants.

:
Civil No.

C85-2626

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Copper State Leasing Company, by and
through its undersigned

counsel, Mark S. Swan of the law firm

RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P . C ,

and pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah

Code of Judicial Administration, hereby objects to the proposed
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law prepared by the attorney
for the Defendant and submitted on March 22, 1991.

This objection

is based upon the fact that the Findings of Fact do not accurately

reflect the findings of the Court at the hearing held on March 11,
1991 at 10:00 a.m.
1.

The specific objections are as follows:

Plaintiff objects to Finding of Fact No. 3 in that the

letter was
Plaintiff.

from

Plaintiff's

predecessor

counsel, and

Furthermore, the undersigned

attorney

and

not

from

current

counsel for the Plaintiff has not been able to review the Court's
file and look at the reported letter and has not been able to
determine whether the language is as represented in the Findings
of Fact.
2.

Plaintiff

objects

to

Finding

of

Fact

No.

6.

The

inference of the second sentence of that paragraph suggests that
Plaintiff argued that the bankruptcy prohibited
pursuing Kim C. Moore.

Plaintiff

from

Plaintiff has never argued that position

but has only argued that the effect of the bankruptcy was relevant
to the issue of damages and prevented Plaintiff from establishing
a liquidated damages figure as against Defendant Kim C. Moore.
Consequently, a correct characterization of Plaintiff's position
regarding one of the reasons for delay should be set-out in the
Findings of Fact.
3.
No. 7.

Plaintiff objects to the proposed Findings in Paragraph
No representation has been made nor has the Court found

that there was an assignment of the lease prior to the December 1,
1986 Order to Show Cause.

In fact, Plaintiff argued that the
2

assignment occurred after December 1, 1986 and argued that the acts
of the assignee materially prejudiced Plaintiff and therefore it
was improper to dismiss the case.
4.

Plaintiff further objects to the proposed Findings of

Fact on the basis that it does not include a factual statement
regarding the Court's reliance on the Court record and not on
Defendant's Motions or pleadings in dismissing this case with
prejudice.

As Plaintiff argued, Defendant filed no affidavits in

support of the Motion to Dismiss. ^The Court clearly stated that
it was relying on judicial notice of the matters in the file and
implicitly dismissed this matter upon its own motion subsequent to
Plaintiff's filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
5.

In addition, Plaintiff further objects on the basis that

there is no mention of the Court's finding that it would not or
could not exercise equitable powers to limit the collection of
interest by Plaintiff due to alleged prejudicial delay.
THEREFORE, based upon these objections, Plaintiff hereby
requests the Court to consider the objection of Plaintiff and to
modify the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
proposed Order to be consistent with the true findings by the Court
and to include all findings made by the Court at the hearing on
March 11, 1991 at 10:00 a.m.

3

DATED this 2 7,-/, day of March, 1991.
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.

ML A

MayFsTswan
Attorney for Plaintiff
Copper State Thrift & Loan

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ D 7 1 4 " day of February., 1991, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following by placing the same in the United
postage paid and addressed as follows:
Robert A. Echard
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

l^tWiJxJ^

-

CS892702.C91
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States mails,
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Third Judicial District

ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
801-621-3317
Fax: 801-621-3340
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C85-2626

CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER,
Judge:

Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.
The plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment

and the

defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on the 11th day of March, 1991, at 10:00
a.m.

The plaintiff was represented in court by its attorney, Mark

S. Swan, and the defendant, Kim C. Moore, was present in court and
represented by his attorney, Robert A. Echard.

The court having

heard argument from the parties, having reviewed the memoranda and
motions filed with the court, and being fully informed in the
LAW OFFICES

premises; now therefore, makes the following findings of fact and

IDLEY, ECHARD
& WARD

conclusions of law:

35 25TH STREET
5DEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 621-3317
AX (801) 621-3340

00178

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Complaint in this action was filed in April of

1985 seeking to collect from the defendant, Kim C. Moore, pursuant
to an agreement guarantying a lease between the plaintiff and the
defendant, Carver Hunter, Inc.

The plaintiff had repossessed the

property which was security for the lease and sought to obtain a
deficiency judgment against Kim C. Moore with interest at the rate
of 18 percent per annum.
2.

On the 1st day of December, 1986, an Order to Show

Cause was issued by the court requiring the parties to show cause
why the Complaint should not be dismissed for failing to prosecute
and a hearing on said motion was set for January 7, 1987.
3.

The plaintiff wrote a letter to the court dated

December 15, 1986, in which the plaintiff committed itself to
proceed with the case as soon as possible and with due diligence.
4.

Thereafter, no change was made in the pleadings and

no further action was taken on the plaintiff's Complaint until the
plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 19,
1990.

The court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment could

have been filed as of January of 1987 and that nothing changed
between 1987 and 1990 as between the parties.
5.

The lease called for interest at the rate of 18

percent per annum and^since 1986 has more than doubled; thereby
causing additional cost and expense to the defendant if a judgment
OFFICES

:Y, ECHARD

were to be obtained against him.

WARD
!"H STREET
UTAH 84401
621-3317
M) 621-3340
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6.

The plaintiff has sought to excuse its delay in

prosecuting this case because of a bankruptcy that had been filed
by other named defendants.

Kim C. Moore did not file a bankruptcy

and there was no federal stay order prohibiting the plaintiff from
proceeding with its case in a timely manner.
7.

The plaintiff contends that it had assigned or

transferred its right in the lease, which is the subject matter
of this Complaint, to Lease West from August of 1986 to 1990.

If

that representation is true, then the lease had been assigned
prior to the December 1, 1986 Order to Show Cause issued by this
court and the December 15, 1986 letter from the plaintiff agreeing
to proceed expeditiously on its case.

Consequently, the court

finds that this fact, if true, does not justify the plaintiff in
failing to prosecute its case.
8.

The court finds that the plaintiff has failed to

timely prosecute its case and therefore the plaintiff's Complaint
should be dismissed with prejudice.
9.

The court does not deal with the issues raised in

the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; that motion being
moot in light of the court's ruling on the defendant's Motion for
Dismissal.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed with

prejudice for failing to proceed with the prosecution of its case
LAW OFFICES

[DLEY, ECHARD

in a timely manner.

&WARD
35 25TH STREET
iDEN, UTAH 84401
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\X (801) 621-3340

3

00180

2.

The court does not rule on the issues raised by the

plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the same having become
moot by reason of the court's dismissal of the action for failing
to prosecute.

^

^

DATED this 3£

day of MitfCh, 199!

tEN^ETH RIG1
"District Count Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO:

PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL:
You

will

please

take

notice

that

the

undersigned

attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore will submit the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the
date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time,
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
1988.

Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this STZ^L

day of March, 1991.

/5L^
s&^fc^*r

"ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant Moore
' OFFICES

2Y, ECHARD
WARD
TH STREET
, UTAH 84401
\ 621-3317
01) 621-3340
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed,
postage prepaid, this %lf2_ day of March, 1991, to Mark S. Swan and
Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 311 South State,
Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.

SECRETARY
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LAW OFFICES

DLEY, ECHARD
&WARD
15 25TH STREET
DEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 621-3317
<X (801) 621-3340
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* ? & * * » Distort
ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
Attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
801-621-3317
Fax: 801-621-3340
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COPPER STATE LEASING COMPANY,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. C85-2626
CARVER HUNTER, INC., a
corporation, KIM C. MOORE,
RANDY J. BUSHNELL and
LAWRENCE D. HUNTER,
Judge:

Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendants.

The plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment and the

defendants Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup on the 11th day of March, 1991, at 10:00
a.m.

The plaintiff was represented in court by its attorney, Mark

S. Swan, and the defendant, Kim C. Moore, was present in court and
represented by his attorney, Robert A. Echard.

The court having

heard argument from the parties, having reviewed the memoranda and
motions filed with the court, and being fully informed in the
OFFICES

Y, ECHARD

premises; now therefore,

NARD
"H STREET
UTAH 84401
621-3317
1) 621-3340
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IT

IS HEREBY ORDERED

that the plaintiff's

cause of

action is dismissed with prejudice for failing to prosecute in a
timely manner

J)
3 ~~^day of lUxtKfir,

DATED t h i s

1991.7

XX-

RIGTRUP^
J i s t r i c t Court Judge
e

LNNE^H

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO:

PLAINTIFF AND ITS COUNSEL:
You

will

please

take

notice

that

the

undersigned

attorney for Defendant Kim C. Moore will submit the foregoing
ORDER

to

Judge

Kenneth

Rigtrup

for

his

signature

upon

the

expiration of five (5) days from the date this notice is mailed
to you, allowing

three

(3) days

for mailing,

unless

written

objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988.

Kindly govern

yourself accordingly.
DATED this _^f^v day of March, 1991.

/ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant Moore
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
LAW OFFICES

[DLEY, ECHARD

I

hereby

certify

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^^2- day of

& WARD
35 25TH ST«EET
,DEN, UTAH 84401
(801) 621-3317
\ X (801) 621-3340
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March, 1991, to Mark S. Swan and Mark E. Medcalf, Attorneys for
Plaintiff, at 311 South State, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, UT
84111.
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